This is part one in a series of posts that focus on understanding
Visual Basic 6.0 (VB6) code, and the tactics and techniques both malware authors and researchers use around it.
This document is a running tally covering many of the various ways
VB6 malware can embed binary data within an executable.
There are 4 main categories:
- string based encodings
- data hidden within the actual opcodes of the program
- data hidden within parts of the
- data in or around normal
Originally I was only going to cover data hidden within the file format itself but for the sake of documentation I decided it is worth covering them all.
Data held within the file format is a special case which I find the most interesting. This is because it can be interspersed within a complex set of undocumented structures which would require advanced knowledge and intricate parsing to detect. In this scenario it would be hard to determine where the data is coming from or to even recognize that these buffers exist.
The first technique is the standard built into the language itself, namely loading data from the resource section.
VB6 comes with an add-in that allows users to add a
.RES file to the project. This file gets compiled into the resource section of the executable and allows for binary data to be easily loaded.
This is a well known and standard technique.
This technique is very old and has been used from all manner of programming language. It will be mentioned again for thoroughness and to link to a public implementation  that allows for simplified use.
Hex String Buffers
It is very common for malware to build up a string of hex characters that are later converted back to binary data. Conversion commonly includes various text manipulations such as decryption or stripping junk character sequences. Extra character sequences are commonly used to prevent automatic recognition of the data as a hex string by AV.
In the context of VB6, there are several limitations. The IDE only allows for a total of
1023 characters to be on a single line. VB’s line continuation syntax of
&_ is also limited to only
25 lines. For these reasons you will often see large blocks of data embedded in the following format:
In a compiled binary each string fragment is held as an individual chunk which is easily identifiable. A faster variant may hold each element in a string array so conglomeration only occurs once.
This is a well known and standard technique. It is commonly found in
VB6 and malware written in many other languages. Line length limitations can not be bypassed through command line compilation.
Binary Data Within Images
There are multiple ways to embed lossless data into image formats. The most common will be to embed the data directly within the structure of a
BITMAP image. Bitmaps can be held directly within
VB6 Image and Picture controls. Data embedded in this manner will be held in the
.FRX form resource file before compilation. Once compiled it will be held in a binary property field for the target form element. Images created like this can be generated with a special tool, and then embedded directly into the form using the IDE.
The following is a public sample of data being extracted from such a bitmap
Extracted images will display as a series of colored blocks and pixels of various colors. Note that this is not stenography.
Many tools understand how to extract embedded images from binary files. Since the image data still contains the
BITMAP header, parsing of the
VB6 file format itself is not necessary. This technique is public and in common use. The data is often decrypted after it is extracted.
Similar to obfuscations found in C malware, strings can be built up at runtime based on individual byte values. A common example may look like the following:
At the asm level, this serves to break up each byte value and puts it inline with a bunch of opcodes preventing automatic detection or display with strings. For native VB6 code it will look like the following:
In P-Code it will look like the following:
This is a well known and standard technique. It is commonly found in VBA as well as VB6 malware.
Numeric arrays are a fairly standard technique in malware that are used to break up the binary data amongst the programs opcodes. This is similar to the Chr technique but can hold data in a more compact format. The most common data types used for this technique are
4 byte longs, and
8 byte currency types. The main advantage of this technique is that the data can be easily manipulated with math to decrypt it on the fly.
This technique is not as popular as the others, but does have a long history of use. I think the first place I saw it was in Flash ActionScript exploits.
Forms and embedded GUI elements can contain compiled in data as part of their properties. The most common attributes used are
Textbox.Text, and any element’s. Tag property.
Since all of these properties are typically entered via the IDE, they are usually found to contain ASCII only data that is later decoded to binary.
Developers can however embed binary data directly into these properties using several techniques.
While there is way to hexedit raw data in the
.FRX form resource file, this comes with limitations such as not being able to handle embedded nulls. Another solution is inserting the data post compilation. With this technique a large buffer is reserved consisting of ASCII text that has start and end markers. An embedding tool can then be run on the compiled executable to fill in the buffer with true binary data.
Using form element properties to house text based data is a common practice and has been seen in
VB6, and even
From the Semi-VBDecompiler source, each different control type (including
ActiveX) has its own parser for these compiled in property fields. Results will vary based on tool used if they can display the data. Semi-Vbdecompiler has an option to dump property blobs to disk for manual exploration. This may be required to reveal this type of embedded binary data.
A special case for the above technique occurs with the built in
UserControl type. This control is used for hosting reusable visual elements and in
OCX creation. The control has two events which are passed a
PropertyBag object of its internal binary settings. This binary data can be easily set in the IDE through property pages. This mechanism can be used to store any kind of binary data including entire file systems. A public example of this technique is available. Embedded data will be held per instance of the
UserControl in its properties on the host form.
VB6 executables store internal strings with a length prefix. Similar to the form properties trick, these entries can be modified post compilation to contain arbitrary binary data. In order to discern these data blobs from other binary data, in depth understanding and complex parsing of the
VB6 file format would have to occur.
The longest string that can be embedded with this technique is limited by the line length in the IDE which is
2042 bytes (
(1023 bytes – 2 for quotes) *2 for unicode).
VB6 malware can access these strings normally with no special loading procedure. As far as its concerned the source was simply
str = “binary data”.
The IDE can handle a number of unicode characters which can be embedded in the source for compilation. Full binary data can be embedded using a post processing technique.
Error Line Numbers
VB6 allows for developers to embed line numbers that can be accessed in the event of an error to help determine its location. This error line number information is stored in a separate table outside of the byte code stream.
The error line number can be accessed through the
Erl() function. VB6 is limited to
0xFFFF line numbers per function, and line number values must be in the
0-0xFFFF range. Since the size of the embedded data is limited with this technique, short strings such as passwords and web addresses are the most likely use.
When the code below is run, it will output the message “secret”
Advanced knowledge of the
VB6 file format would be required in order to discern this data from other parts of the file. Embedded data is sequential and readable if not encoded in some other way.
AddressOf operator allows
VB6 easy runtime access to the address of a public function in a module. It is possible to include a dummy function that is filled with just placeholder instructions to create a blank buffer within the
.text section of the executable. This buffer can be easily loaded into a byte array with a
CopyMemory call. A simple post compilation embedding could be used to fill in the arbitrary data.
For P-Code compiles,
AddressOf returns the offset of a loader stub with a structure offset. P-Code compiles would require several extra steps but would still be possible.
 Embedded files appended to executable – theTrik:
 Embedding binary data in Bitmap images – theTrik:
 UserControl binary data embedding – theTrik:
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